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Abstract. Arrow’s information paradox asserts that demand for undisclosed information is 
undefined. Reassessing the paradox, I argue that the value of information for the buyer 
depends on its relevance, which can be known ex ante, and the uncertainty shifts to the 
capability of the seller to acquire the knowledge and her reliability in disclosing it. These 
three together form the buyer’s reservation price. Consequently, differences in capability and 
reliability between the sellers may revoke the appropriation problem of nonproprietary 
information, where the original source loses her monopoly after the first purchase. 
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1 Introduction 
Conventional economic wisdom says that due to the inherent properties of knowledge, 
markets for information cannot exist in the absence of intellectual property rights (IPR). Yet 
this conclusion, while seemingly theoretically sound, appears startling in today’s economy. 
On a daily basis and in an increasing quantity various different kinds of information are 
traded, for which property rights are unavailable or unenforceable. These include, naming a 
few, financial and market information, news, weather forecasts, databases, and encyclopedic, 
professional and leisure related knowledge (see, Boldrin and Levine, 2008a, for numerous 
other examples). In the light of this phenomenon it seems relevant to consider whether the 
microtheoretic analysis of information and knowledge has missed something important. 
The main contribution of this study will be to show that while Arrow’s information 
paradox diagnoses a genuine problem in trading information, the nature of the problem is 
misunderstood. Despite the inherent uncertainty, the demand for undisclosed information is 
seldom non-existing. Instead, it depends on the seller’s capability (the likelihood of having 
the information) and reliability (the likelihood of disclosing the information) and the 
relevance of the information for the buyer (the utility of correct information when received). 
Differences in capability and reliability, i.e. whether one is more likely to have and/or to 
disclose the information, may also solve the appropriation problem of the supply side, which 
is illustrated with tentative models of producer and consumer markets. 
In essence, this paper bridges gaps between three different literatures: markets for 
technology (e.g. Muto, 1986; d’Aspremont et al., 2000; Henry & Ponce, 2011), strategic 
information transmission (e.g. Crawford & Sobel, 1982; Farrell & Rabin, 1996; Dewatripont 
& Tirole, 2005), and signalling (Spence, 1973; Nelson, 1974; King, 2003; Gentzkow & 
Shapiro, 2006). Most papers studying the markets for technology have assumed IPR, in which 
case the valuation and appropriation problems, as identified by Arrow (1962), are considered 
to disappear. While some papers have studied such markets without IPR, they have usually 
assumed that the value of information is common knowledge and manipulation is not 
possible, which has permitted them to concentrate on technology resale and the problem of 
appropriation (e.g. Muto, 1986, 1990; Hellwig & Irmen, 2001; Boldrin & Levine, 2002, 
2008b; Henry & Ponce, 2011). In this paper though, we proceed with the idea that the 
valuation problem persists also in potential resale, which can give an advantage to the original 
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source. Besides technological knowledge, another type of information that has also attracted 
substantial interest has been financial information (Leland & Pyle, 1977; Ramakrishnan & 
Thakor, 1984; Allen, 1990; Admati & Pfleiderer, 1990). A general conclusion in the finance 
literature has been that the problems in trading information provide a rationale for financial 
intermediation. 
Closest to our approach are the two papers by Anton and Yao, which address Arrow’s 
information paradox directly. In their first paper (Anton & Yao 1994), the inventor is able to 
overcome the problems by first disclosing the technology to one firm for free and then 
appropriate some of the value by threatening the new monopoly by disclosing the technology 
to its competitors. In their second paper (Anton & Yao, 2002), the inventor is able to make a 
partial disclosure, which signals the value of the remaining undisclosed information to the 
potential buyers. Similarly in King (2003), the form of contracting offered by the inventor is a 
guaranteed signal of the value of the invention to the buyers. As Anton and Yao (2005) sum 
up, markets for information have been typically studied as either a valuation problem or an 
appropriation problem. 
Conditions under which markets for information will emerge and operate efficiently can be 
very challenging (Gans & Stern, 2010). In an attempt to address these challenges, we develop 
a model in which the demand for information is determined, under favorable conditions, 
without revealing anything ex ante. This also implies that there are no spillovers (cf. Baccara 
& Razin, 2007), which allows us to concentrate on the potential appropriation problem caused 
by the resale of information. As such, our model starts with the valuation problem, which is 
then applied to solve the subsequent appropriation problem in the presence of unrestricted 
resale. While price-taking inventors may be able to profit as well (Hellwig & Irmen, 2001; 
Boldrin & Levine, 2008b), here we demonstrate that the original source of new information 
might have some natural market power even without IPR.  
We model the demand for information to depend on relevance, capability, and reliability. 
Relevance is the value of knowledge for the buyer, which can be known beforehand when 
description is possible without disclosure. Whether the buyer receives knowledge after having 
paid for it, however, depends on the seller’s capability, i.e. how likely the seller’s belief is 
true, and reliability, how likely the seller is to disclose her belief. Our idea of capability 
borrows from the signaling literature in the sense that the seller is able to signal his capability 
by, for example, an observable R&D investment. The notion of reliability is connected to the 
strategic information transmission literature, in which the central idea is that the 
informativeness of a message, which is not costly to send, depends on the incentives of the 
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sender. Similarly as in this literature, our paper attempts to address different kinds of 
information exchanges rather than merely that of technology. Information-embedded goods 
that are stored in a digital form, such as music, movies or software, are beyond our scope, 
since these are not bought to gain any knowledge per se (see, however, Schmidt, 2006), 
although knowledge required to produce such goods is within it. Deviating from the 
information transmission literature, however, we assume that acquiring knowledge requires a 
costly investment, which is worthwhile only if the investor receives a sufficient monetary 
compensation. What we attempt to offer in the end is not only a reconsideration of Arrow’s 
information paradox but also a new perspective on markets for information and on the role of 
capability and reliability in them. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we will address Arrow’s 
paradox by claiming that the demand for information can exist but it depends on capability, 
reliability and relevance. The following section continues with this proposition, 
operationalizes these three factors and attempts to illustrate that due to them the market price 
for nonproprietary information is not necessarily driven to zero after the first purchase. First 
we study the phenomenon in a producer market and after that in a consumer market. The final 
section concludes the paper.  
2 Arrow’s paradox and demand for information 
“[T]here is a fundamental paradox in the determination of demand for information; its value 
for the purchaser is not known until he knows the information, but then he has in effect 
acquired it without cost.” Kenneth Arrow (1962, p. 615) 
 
Arrow’s information paradox, quoted above, states that ex ante the buyer cannot assess the 
value of some particular information; it can be known only after it has been disclosed. But 
then again, the buyer has no reason to compensate the seller ex post. Hence, there is no 
demand for information as such. The paradox can be solved through IPR, such as patents, not 
by making the pre-disclosure valuation easier but by removing the disincentive to disclose the 
information (Gans & Stern, 2003). That is, protection cannot be given to an undisclosed 
invention, but it is assumed that a patent officer will not use or distribute it (unlike a potential 
buyer would do) before granting the patent, which then allows the inventor to appropriate the 
social value of her invention. 
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The impossibility of valuation in Arrow’s paradox arises when a statement is self-
referential or self-descriptive. Pure examples of this in natural language seem hard to find, 
since we can usually describe what particular information is about without giving it away. As 
such, it seems that in its strongest form Arrow’s paradox assumes a certain kind of one-
dimensional information. For example, think of a sequence of binary digits (e.g. “01100010”) 
and that the only way to describe it is to articulate the complete sequence itself. 
Admittedly, the expected value of undefined information cannot be determined, because as 
long as we are unaware of some types of information we cannot form any probability 
distribution over all the different types of information. As such, it has been acknowledged for 
some time that the standard state-space model is incompatible with analyzing unawareness 
(Dekel et al., 1998). A key issue in this respect is the so-called axiom of wisdom (also known 
as negative introspection), i.e. “one knows what one does not know”. While one might not 
always know what one does not, Arrow’s paradox, however, is incompatible with awareness 
altogether; according to it one can never know what one doesn’t know. Equivalently, one 
could not ask a question without already knowing the answer. 
 If however, we grant that we can in some cases be aware of something that we do not 
know, the paradox disappears. Relevance, or the value, of knowledge cannot be known before 
the buyer is told what the information is about, i.e. if the buyer does not know what he might 
not know. Specifying the type of information offered, however, need not always disclose the 
information itself or any part of it (cf. Anton & Yao, 2002; see also, Klein, 2002, p. 182). 
What the buyer needs to ponder in this situation is whether the seller is in a position of being 
capable of acquiring and reliable in disclosing the knowledge. The uncertainty concerns no 
longer the type of knowledge, but whether it will be gained after the purchase, which depends 
on the seller’s characteristics. Some cases, most importantly certain business ideas, might not 
permit any significant description without disclosing the information altogether, but this 
seems a special rather than the general case. 
At this point we are ready to fix some central concepts within the context of Arrow’s 
paradox. The starting point is that individuals wish to gain knowledge of facts that are 
relevant to them. Since there is no direct access to anyone’s mental states, gaining knowledge 
from others requires an exchange of information, which can be in verbal, written or in some 
other such form. If the belief held by the sender/seller is true in the sense that it corresponds 
to a fact, we say that she knows the fact. The following is where the distinction between 
information and knowledge becomes apparent. The belief of the seller either corresponds to a 
fact or not, which is a matter of her capability and determines whether she knows the fact. In 
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addition, the sent message, i.e. information, either corresponds to her belief or not, which is a 
matter of reliability. With perfect capability and reliability the information corresponds to a 
fact and the receiver/buyer has gained new knowledge. 
2.1 Relevance 
The relevance of information is the value of knowing the fact to the buyer. As knowledge is a 
discrete and durable good (assuming perfect memory or other form of storage), this value can 
be gained only once and further purchases do not yield anything. Relevance can be exogenous 
or endogenous and either symmetrical or asymmetrical between the buyers. In the case of 
knowledge as a consumer good, relevance is exogenous as the number of others possessors or 
other market factors do not affect it. In this case relevance may be different between the 
consumers (C) as some value particular knowledge higher than others. Here we use a notation 
that the relevance for an individual i is     , with equality when the information is utterly 
irrelevant for the individual or she already has it. In our later analysis, however, we make a 
simplifying assumption by supposing that the value is the same for all   potential buyers. 
This assumption is made because even in the case of permanent monopolist in a durable 
goods market, it has been found that the model specification in the case of heterogeneous 
buyers affects greatly the outcome (see, Bagnoli et al. 1989; von der Ferh & Kühn, 1995). Our 
attempt is merely to demonstrate that the original seller may retain some market power even 
when resale is unrestricted. 
When knowledge is an intermediate good, the potential buyer is typically a firm (F) that 
can use the knowledge to develop new goods or produce existing goods more efficiently. 
When the customer firms, again indexed by i, are homogenous they value the knowledge 
similarly, i.e.      for all firms N. Among rival firms, however, knowledge has a strategic 
component and the relevance is therefore endogenous and depends on the number of all the 
firms, n, that have acquired the knowledge. That is,        where         and, typically, 
  
  
  . Relevance includes, but is not restricted to, a process innovation, which decreases the 
marginal production cost from level   to  . Usually in the literature this situation is modeled 
as a Cournot oligopoly between similar firms, to which an inventor offers a license of the 
process innovation. In the case of (non-drastic) process innovation, it can be shown that 
        and         . (See, Proposition 1 in the appendix.) 
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While the value of knowledge is given by relevance, this is not the same as the value of 
information as the latter is the expectation of whether the knowledge will be gained after the 
payment, that is       . This expected value depends on capability and reliability and, 
unlike relevance, these depend on the seller’s characteristics. As per the R&D firm (RD), the 
original source and seller, we assume that in both cases the knowledge has no relevance to 
her, i.e.      . 
2.2 Capability 
Capability is important in this framework because the seller cannot prove ex ante that she 
knows the fact, only claim that she does. Capability is therefore the probability that the claim 
is true. In some cases, capability could simply be exogenous and depend on the observed type 
of the seller. For example, because of their background, education, local circumstances etc. 
some individuals are more likely to know particular things than others. Many times, however, 
gaining knowledge requires a costly investment, in which case the social dissemination of 
knowledge is crucial for capturing its non-rival benefits. If the knowledge investment is 
observable it can then be taken as a signal of capability. Here the meaning of signal is slightly 
different than usually in the literature, as the investment is considered to reveal and to affect 
the capability directly rather than merely reveal one’s innate capability. The output of 
knowledge investment is uncertain, particularly in the case of technological research and 
development investments, but more likely higher the effort. In this paper, therefore, we model 
capability of the seller, κ, as a function of an observable investment cost, c, such that after 
some minimum level of necessary investment,  ,  (   )       , and  (   )    
otherwise, and that         . We assume   to be high enough so that it prevents all the 
potential customers to invest themselves for their own use. Likewise, it requires that RD 
receives sufficient revenue as she does not benefit from the investment directly. This is, after 
all, the context where the profitability of specializing in knowledge production and invention 
becomes critical for efficient division of labor and reduction in the duplication of effort 
(Baumol, 2004). Capability is assumed to be common knowledge among all the market 
participants. 
Besides an R&D investment, the capability could also be signalled by reputation 
(Gentzkow & Shapiro, 2006), contracting behavior (King, 2003), professional credentials or 
education (Spence, 1973), advertising (Nelson, 1974), or by a combination of several factors. 
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Some cases may also permit signalling by partial disclosure (Anton & Yao, 2002). Situations 
where Arrow’s paradox comes true can also be fit to our framework. These could include 
business ideas or screenplays, which can be hard to describe without giving the central idea 
away. In this context, it would simply mean that the seller cannot convince the buyer that she 
truly has a valuable idea through any other means than by revealing it completely and is hence 
unable to signal her capability. Again, we take it as a special rather than the general case. 
2.3 Reliability 
In addition to capability, reliability is the other factor that affects the expected value of 
information. Critically, this becomes an issue when the seller can, not only withhold 
information, but also manipulate it (Hirshleifer, 1973; Milgrom & Roberts, 1986; Henry, 
2009). Even if the seller knows the fact (i.e. has perfect capability), no knowledge is gained 
by the buyer unless the seller sincerely discloses it after being paid. In this regard, the seller 
has two options: either disclose her belief     or misreport it   ̃ . In this paper we assume 
that even if the buyer is able to later verify the received information, he cannot attest in the 
court that the received misinformation was due to dishonesty rather than a lack of capability.  
Reliability is then clearly an endogenous factor as the decision to disclose depends on the 
seller’s incentives. The informativeness of a disclosure hence depends on how closely related 
agents’ goals are. This issue has been studied in the context of strategic communication (e.g. 
Crawford & Sobel, 1982; Farrell & Rabin, 1996; Dewatripont & Tirole, 2005), but it is 
equally relevant when information is exchanged for money. Similar agency problems have 
earlier been shown to arise in political advisory (Dur & Swank, 2005; Che & Kartik, 2009), 
persuasion (Mullainathan et al., 2008), and group decision-making (Visser & Swank, 2007). 
When the inventor’s wealth serves as a bond (King, 2003) this can also be considered as 
increasing the reliability by aligning the incentives of the seller and the buyer. 
A critical assumption we make in this regard is based on what epistemologists call 
“testimonial foundationalism”. According to it, a person is entitled to accept, as a default, 
something that is presented as true; unless there are reasons not to do so (see Goldman, 1999). 
We take this to mean also that the seller will disclose the information if she is indifferent 
regarding that choice, which is also known as the assumption of intrinsic preference for 
honesty in implementation theory literature (Matsushima, 2008). In the concluding section we 
will return to discuss this assumption.  
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As the disclosure can take place only after the buyer has decided whether to pay     or not 
  ̃ , reliability of the seller, ρ, is either     if         ̃  or     if         ̃ . 
While in this paper the decisions are made sequentially, due to Arrow’s information paradox, 
in some situations it could be possible to use the mixed strategy for reliability if the choices 
are made simultaneously. In such a case, reliability of the seller (S) is the probability of 
disclosing her belief,  , in the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium:     (   ̃)    
  
       
    
          
   and         ̅       
       
    
          
  , where   is 
the set of probability distributions on the available strategies. In some other context, where it 
would be natural to assume the seller’s type to be private knowledge, reliability can be 
considered as the probability that a particular seller is of sincere type. 
2.4 Demand for information 
Having determined the components of the expected value of information, we can show that 
the reservation price for (one unit of) information,   , is the price where the buyer is 
indifferent between buying the information or not, i.e. 
                ,         (1) 
where m is the consumer’s income. Suppose further a quasilinear utility function, 
                 , such that              and       . Then (1) gives us 
            and the reservation price is then given by  
      .            (2) 
If in the equilibrium all of the three factors on the RHS of (2) are positive, then there exists 
demand for information. Consequently, our interpretation of Arrow’s information paradox is 
therefore, that it describes an equilibrium where the reservation price is zero, particularly 
when it is impossible to signal capability except by disclosing the information altogether. The 
lack of capability or reliability may also explain why some knowledge appears to be tacit and 
resists dissemination (Leppälä, 2012). Assuming that the knowledge is equally relevant to all 
the potential buyers  , the market demand for information is        when       and 
zero otherwise.  
Note that due to the sequence of events as dictated by Arrow’s information paradox, the 
possible verifiability of information has no effect in a one stage game: the buyer can verify 
the truthfulness of information only afterwards and the seller cannot do anything else but to 
signal it through his capability. However, if the market for information extends to several 
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periods, then verifiability might result to belief updating. For simplicity, we therefore assume 
that the received information is unverifiable, at least during the game. One should also note 
that positive relevance, capability and reliability are not always sufficient for a positive 
reservation price. If information is unverifiable and false information would lead to a costly 
action, C, i.e. a bad investment decision or missing the train, then this should be incorporated 
to the reservation price such that                      . In our examples we do not, 
however, consider this possibility. 
The difference between the reservation price and the actual market price will depend on the 
buyer’s possible profits from resale as well as on the outside options, namely purchasing the 
information in a later period or making the investment yourself. Everything else except the 
information possessed by the seller(s) is here assumed to be common knowledge. 
3 Appropriability and markets for information 
In the previous section it was proposed that Arrow’s information paradox is not a 
fundamental obstacle to markets for information. The nature of information sets some specific 
requirements, but when they are met the demand for information exists. There is, however, 
another problem, also noticed by Arrow (1962), which still remains. If there is only a fixed 
cost of producing information and the marginal cost of selling it is zero, then due to 
competition the market price of information will go to zero after the first purchase. In general, 
the situation is at first much like any durable goods monopoly (e.g. Coase, 1972; von der Ferh 
& Kühn, 1995), but with a difference that after the first period the former buyers are permitted 
to resell the information they have bought. As such, the fulfilment of the Coase conjecture 
would imply the breakdown of the market. 
However, the difficulty in valuating information before disclosure prevails also in resale. 
As such, there may be differences in capability and reliability between the sellers that permit a 
positive price for information and prevent the collapse of the market. The valuation problem 
may then be a solution to the appropriation problem. Conversely, if the valuation problem 
does not exist then market power will also vanish. 
When there are two or more sellers and no binding capacity constraints in disclosing the 
information, the market price is determined by Bertrand competition between the two most 
competent sellers. Suppose that sellers 1 and 2 are the most competent, i.e. the product of 
their reliability and capability is higher than that of any other seller, if there exist any, and that 
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there is at least one buyer, whose relevance is   . The buyer, whether a firm or a final 
consumer, will choose the seller 1 over 2 if  
 
                   ,        (3) 
 
where    and    are the sellers’ respective asking prices. Suppose that 1 is the more 
competent of the two and therefore,
 
         . Since the marginal price is zero, the less 
competent 2 will tighten the competition until     . Hence, in order to keep its customers, 1 
cannot set any price higher than     κ    κ      , which is set to equality to maximize 
profits. For simplicity, we assume that every buyer will choose the more competent seller in 
this case, as seller 1 could decrease its asking price by an infinitesimal amount,  , to make its 
offer strictly better. In general therefore, the market price is given by 
 
  |             |,         (4) 
 
and it is above zero if there are differences in competence between the two most competent 
sellers (1 and 2). The implication of Bertrand competition is that only the most competent 
seller is able to make profit, given that the difference in competency, i.e. a competence 
premium, covers the initial investment cost. Note that other, less competent sellers would 
have no effect on the equilibrium price. 
Next, we will endogenize these two important factors for markets for information. To 
analyze the importance of reliability, we first study a producer market where the relevance of 
information depends on its commonness among rival producers. After that we move on to a 
consumer market where this strategic component in the value of information is absent. There, 
when the reliability is the same among potential sellers, differences in capability become 
relevant. 
3.1 Reliability and markets for intermediate information 
The first situation concerns a producer market where there are   similar, rival firms (F). In 
addition, there is one R&D firm (RD), not competing at the same market, but which offers to 
sell the firms some particular information. (While having named it as such, RD could equally 
well be a consulting firm selling market information or a bank selling financial information.) 
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The rival producers value the information similarly, but the relevance depends on its 
commonness as noted earlier. Critically, we assume that RD is fully able to commit not to 
enter the market where the other firms compete and as such the information it produces has no 
direct value to it. To cover the investment cost, which also signals it capability, it needs, 
however, receive large enough revenues from the other firms. 
The timeline is the following: 
1. RD chooses the investment c, which is observed by Fs and reveals RD’s capability   to 
them. 
2. RD chooses its price p for the first period and customer firms decide whether to 
purchase the information or postpone. 
3. If there is unsatisfied demand left, the market price is set by Bertrand competition as in 
(4) between RD and its former customers. This process continues as long as the market 
for information has cleared. 
4. When the information market has cleared, the customer firms engage in (Cournot) 
competition and the relevance in the second stage market is realized with probability 
   to all who had bought the information. 
We assume that there is no discounting between the stages 2, 3 and 4 due to unlimited 
possibilities to buy and resell before stage 4. However, we assume that while a seller is able to 
supply multiple buyers simultaneously, buyers only make one purchase in any moment. The 
critical issue in this market is that if resale at stage 3 decreases the price level to zero then this 
will also decrease Fs’ willingness to pay at stage 2. If the total revenue is low, a high 
investment   is not worthwhile. We proceed to study the equilibrium outcome through 
backward induction. 
At stage 4, the benefit that a firm receives from having bought the information is       , 
which is also his reservation price. To concentrate on the issue of reliability, we assume that 
the events on stage 2 are common knowledge because the market is small and everyone 
observes who has purchased the information. This implies that the capability is only 
determined by the initial investment   and is hence the same for all sellers, whether RD or any 
of its former customers. Reliability, on the other hand, depends from whom the information is 
purchased. Let’s then proceed to stage 3 assuming that there are several sellers. 
Since any remaining customer has always the opportunity to buy the information from RD, 
also its competitors would be willing to sell the information, even if some competitive 
advantage is lost. Due to Arrow’s paradox, however, the decision regarding information 
disclosure is always made after the payment.  
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The decision to disclose the information does not affect RD’s payoff, i.e. it will receive the 
asking price in any case. The situation is different for any F attempting to resale, however. By 
disclosing the information, F loses some of the informational value of its earlier purchase, 
                , since one of its rivals receives the same information. Hence, 
irrespective of the price it will never disclose the knowledge truthfully, because    ̃    
          and hence     . RD, on the other hand, is indifferent regarding the 
disclosure, since           ̃ . Therefore,       as assumed earlier. To use the 
terminology of Muto (1990), the market is “resale-proof” as no rival firm can be expected to 
disclose the information truthfully. 
During any period, no F will buy the information from its rival and RD retains its 
monopoly even if it does not have exclusive rights to sell the information. RD will thus set the 
market price equal to the Fs’ reservation price. Since      , however, buyers know that the 
information is leaked to their rivals as well and the relevance is thus     . If           , 
some F could in principle bribe RD to not to disclose the information to others. Without any 
contract enforcement mechanism such as transferable rights or equity stakes (Bhattacharya & 
Guriev, 2006; King, 2003), however, this is not possible: if paid up front, RD has no incentive 
to keep its promise, and neither will RD receive any payment afterwards whether it has 
complied or not. 
Therefore, RD sets             and all F make the purchase at stage 2. Recursively, 
the optimal investment c* in stage 1 is such that it maximizes profits,                
 , where         is RD’s discount factor, hence given by                 . To 
restate, an important feature of this model is that rival Fs cannot commit to disclose the 
information, whereas RD cannot commit not to disclose it. This outcome is largely due to the 
sequential form of the game as given by Arrow’s information paradox. 
In a similar sense as in Anton and Yao (1994), the rivalry between the buyer firms helps to 
overcome the appropriation problem and trade of information emerges without IPR. Here 
however, the trade does not stop after the first purchase, hence permitting a wider utilization 
of knowledge from the social point of view. With a patent, RD might benefit from exclusive 
licensing, but given the incentive for issuing multiple licenses the only alternative would be to 
sell the patent itself to a single firm. Depending on the characteristics of the product market, 
the optimal number of sales can be either 1 or   or anything in between. Therefore as in Muto 
(1987), patents, if they have an effect, would be expected to benefit the innovator but decrease 
the consumers’ welfare. 
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3.2 Capability and markets for consumer information 
In comparison to producer markets, trading information in consumer markets is very similar 
with respect to the fact that the first purchase will break the monopoly. The process follows 
the same timeline as earlier and the number of purchases per period is limited to one but sales 
are unlimited. However, when information is a consumer good its value is independent of its 
commonness and hence has no strategic value. In other words,      for all i, making the 
simplifying assumption that the information is equally relevant for all consumers. For 
simplicity we further assume that    . Furthermore, as the relevance is not captured during 
any particular period as such, we introduce discounting between the periods to capture the 
time value of information. 
Regarding information disclosure, every consumer (C) will behave like RD in the previous 
part. As one does not need to part with her knowledge when disclosing it, we do not need 
similar legal rights to enforce the seller to keep her side of the bargain. For this reason, 
contrary to normal goods, property rights are not similarly fundamental for information. 
Furthermore, when information is a consumer good, it is unlikely even in the first place that 
IPR would solve Arrow’s paradox. Since it is next to impossible to know if a consumer has 
benefitted from disclosed information, IPR do not encourage disclosure before payment. As 
such, their main effect is to prevent resale by former customers. Nevertheless,          
for consumer markets and RD cannot anymore rely on the lack of reliability among buyers. 
Capability is hence the factor which becomes critical.  
Let us assume that       . Hence, for period one, it is only RD who has the knowledge 
with probability      . For the forthcoming periods, the capability of Cs, and hence the 
market price, will depend on previous purchases. This issue makes the strategic interaction 
between consumers and RD highly important. 
In general, a C prefer to postpone their purchase if 
 
                  , 
 
where       is the consumers’ and RD’s discount factor. Suppose for now that the 
market is small and Cs know who has previously bought the information from RD. Cs can 
then choose to purchase the information now or postpone their purchase and wait for the next 
period. For small markets,        for those Cs who bought the information, as they have 
been observed to do that, and hence the price for the next period will be zero.  
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If                , we have   asymmetric pure strategy equilibria where one of 
the consumers buys the information in period 1 and rest of them in period 2 at price     . 
Therefore, if         , RD sets        and gets one purchase in period    . 
Recursively, the optimal investment in     is given by 
 
  
  
           .         
 
If         , RD sets            , and all the consumers make their purchase 
during    . Optimal investment at     in this case is given by 
 
  
  
                 .         
 
More relevant for consumer markets, however, is the situation where the market is large 
and anonymous, and hence the consumers do not know who has bought the information 
previously and are unable to play a coordinated pure strategy equilibrium. A former buyer 
finds it harder than the producer to authenticate her possession of knowledge, since anyone 
could claim that (Hirshleifer, 1971, 1973). Therefore, every buyer is unsure who of all the 
others claiming to possess the information actually have it. If again the cost c is observable 
and the actual purchases of information are not, the producer has an advantage.  The situation 
is best illustrated by studying the mixed strategy equilibrium, which highlights the 
expectation regarding any C’s capability. 
As before, RD is free to set the price for the first period,   , but the prices for the 
subsequent periods depends on the Cs’ mixed strategies of having already purchased the 
information. Note that we prevent an early exit by RD, even if such a threat could be 
profitable, since we assume that potential future revenues after the exit make this commitment 
incredible. 
Let    be the probability that each C purchases the information during period  . For     
we have     , for              and in general for any period        
   ∑   
     
   . In that case, the market clears in   periods when ∑   
 
     . In the mixed 
strategy equilibrium each consumer is indifferent regarding the period when to purchase, i.e. 
 
                    
               
             (5) 
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This implies that the price in any period   satisfies        
      
    
 The price after the 
first period depends on the cumulative probability of past purchases, i.e.       
∑   
   
        . As such, the mixed strategies that support the equilibrium (5) are    
      
    
 
for the first period and      
             
     
 for the subsequent periods. Since the market 
clears in   periods, the following price will be          
      
  
  . This implies that 
  ⌈
   [  
  
   
]
      
⌉, where   is the next integer greater than or equal to 
   [  
  
   
]
      
. Note that RD 
can always clear the market in the first period by setting        )    , which implies that 
    . If the consumers are relatively patient (i.e.       as we will see later), then RD 
may wish to extend the trading to several periods. Based on the above mixed strategies, RD’s 
profit function in period 1 is 
            ∑   
       
   
      
         (  
      
    
 ∑     (    
   
   
      
    
)
             
     
     (    
      
    
) (  
      
    
 ∑
             
     
   
   ))  
where the last term imposes the restriction that exactly all the remaining consumers will 
purchase during the last period. The profit function further simplifies as follows: 
       (  
      
    
      
             
 
 
(     )        
 
       
     (    
      
    
) (  
      
    
 
(     )        
       
))         
                  
         
 
 (6)  
  
Since   ⌈
   [  
  
   
]
      
⌉ as an integer function is discontinuous, we ignore the ceiling for 
now to get an approximate value and (6) becomes 
       
  (  
        [  
  
   
]
      
)    ( 
  
   
 
   [  
  
   
]
      
 
    [  
  
   
]
      
)
 
 
                 [  
  
   
]
       
  
The optimal starting price for the first period is found by 
      
   
  
             
    (  
  
   
)      
  
        [  
  
   
]
       
 
      (     [  
  
   
])
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      [  
  
   
]      
  (  
 
 
)      
As the market clears in the first period if            ,   
  (  
 
 
)        
     . In other words if       then   
  (  
 
 
)     and otherwise   
          . 
In the first case, the maximum profit will thus be     
   
         
        
 and the market clears in 
  ⌈ 
 
      
⌉ periods. As can be expected, a high time-sensitivity of information, low  , 
clears the market faster. Lastly, the optimal investment in period 0 is given by      
  
  
 
      
       
         . 
Figures illustrating the situation are in the appendix. As Fig. 1 shows, with   
     
     , RD’s rate of appropriation, 
    
  
    
 
     
        
, depends linearly of  . Nevertheless, this 
is the optimal choice when      , since the market would clear in one period anyway. If 
the consumers are more patient, then   
  (  
 
 
)     is optimal, since while the profit 
decreases with increasing   some of the social value is always appropriated.  
The importance of the result is that it challenges a central thesis of the microeconomics of 
information, as expressed here by Hirshleifer (1973, p. 35, emphasis in the original): 
“Unpatented information is safeguarded by secrecy, which is always compromised by sale. 
The key problem for the existence of a market in such information is the prevention of 
unauthorized resale.” Here we have shown that unrestricted resale of information does not 
remove all the market power from the original information producer. Even when the 
consumers (and RD) are very patient (i.e.    ), using L’Hôpital’s rule we find that RD’s 
revenue is       
         
        
 
    
 
 and it is thus able to appropriate a considerable share of 
the social value of the information even in the worst case.  
Fig. 2 illustrates how it takes longer for the market to clear when the discount rate is 
higher. Similarly as in Fig. 3, the red line illustrate the values with continuous time and the 
green piece-wise lines with the actual ceiling function. In Fig. 3 we see that the optimal price 
that we solved assuming continuous time is relatively good approximation of what it is in the 
case of discrete time. Fig. 3 present the rate of appropriation for three values of the discount 
factor, 0.4, 0.6 and 0.8, and the higher the factor (and the lower the appropriation rate) the 
more closely the piecewise function follows the continuous one. An interesting feature of our 
result is that even without heterogeneity and subsequent price discrimination we may observe 
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a decreasing price and a gradual social dispersion of new knowledge over time as illustrated 
in Fig 4a and 4b. 
4 Concluding remarks 
The starting point of this paper was to argue that the demand for undisclosed information 
depends on the seller’s capability and reliability and on the relevance of the information to the 
buyer. When all three are positive, the demand for information exists and Arrow’s 
information paradox does not hold. As the same difficulties in assessing the value of 
information persist in subsequent resale of information, the original producer of the 
information can have a competitive advantage that retains some of the market power even 
when nothing prevents costless resale as such. When the pool of customers consists of rival 
firms, this advantage is due to the lack of reliability between the firms. Even when the 
strategic value of information is absent but the market is anonymous, the original seller is 
perceived to be more capable, i.e. it is more probable that it actually has the information than 
any other anonymous seller claiming likewise. As such, we consider this framework to yield 
an economic interpretation as to why knowing the source of information is indeed important. 
The framework is not only relevant for studying actual markets for nonproprietary 
information, but also for understanding the role of IPR in other markets or why some markets 
for information do not exist at all. 
The central element that our approach provides for analyzing competition in information 
markets of various kinds is the quality (i.e. truthfulness) of information. For instance, the long 
dominance of Encyclopædia Britannica in the English language encyclopedia market can 
largely be attributed to its excellent reputation for authoritative and trustworthy content 
(Evans & Wurster, 2000).  Later the market leader became challenged by Microsoft Encarta 
(now discontinued) and Wikipedia. However, the fact Britannica still exist today when the 
same type of information is available for free can arguably be attributed to its higher quality. 
Yet, it has been claimed that the difference in accuracy between Britannica and Wikipedia has 
greatly diminished (Giles, 2005). Understanding well the criticality of such claims to its 
revenues, Britannica has forcefully attempted to refute them (Encyclopædia Britannica, 
2006). 
While this paper gave examples where the markets for information can function without 
IPR, it is clearly the case that this outcome requires various conditions to hold. Otherwise the 
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outcome is the no-trade equilibrium. While this could be viewed as a weakness of the model, 
we consider it as strength to the extent that the model illuminates the real fragility of markets 
for information. If we reserve the assumption of testimonial foundationalism, for example, i.e. 
that every indifferent seller would never honestly disclose the information, then no trade 
would emerge. Nevertheless, when a sufficient number of potential sellers have intrinsic 
preference for honesty, there can be a market for information. In a related manner in 
implementation theory, even a small preference for honesty has been found to eliminate 
unwanted equilibria (Matsushima, 2008). Sincere sellers may, furthermore, signal their type, 
which prompts us to consider the importance of reputation in repetitive markets for 
information. Subsequent applications could consider, for example, the news industry or credit 
rating agencies. A dynamic model would be a relevant extension in this regard but that is left 
for subsequent research.  
Similarly, a complete welfare analysis and comparison to markets for proprietary 
information would require further specifications to our model. In the case where the buyers 
are firms, we should also factor in the welfare of their customers. In the case where the buyers 
are final consumers, we would need to introduce heterogeneity in order to analyse the 
comparative welfare gains and losses. In both cases, IPR could also create a patent race and 
duplication of effort when there is more than one potential inventor. As such, this paper is 
merely a starting point for what we perceive to be a relevant line of research. 
 
Appendix 
Relevance of a process innovation in an N firm symmetrical Cournot oligopoly 
Proposition 1. Relevance of a process innovation in an N firm symmetrical Cournot oligopoly 
has the properties         and          depending on the number of firms, n, that have 
acquired the marginal cost reducing,    , technology. 
 
Proof. Suppose that there are N firms that face linear inverse demand curve,       , 
where Q is the sum of their output and P its market price. Initially, each firm has a constant 
marginal cost  , but has now the option to purchase technology that enables production with a 
lower marginal cost  . The difference between the marginal costs is not assumed to be large 
enough to affect the number of output producing firms. When n is the number of all firms that 
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have the new technology, including firm i if it chooses so, the profits for firm i under the two 
marginal costs are 
  
 (  
   )  (       
   (         
      
  ))   
     (7) 
  
 (  
   )  (       
   (       
          
  ))   
    (8) 
The first order conditions of (7) and (8) with respect to output    are 
  
  
   
  
 
         
      
  
 
        (9) 
  
  
   
  
 
       
          
  
 
        (10) 
In the Nash equilibrium (9) and (10) are the best responses to each other and as the output 
choices of firms with the same marginal cost are the same, these can be presented as 
  
  
   
  
 
         
     
 
 
         (11) 
  
  
   
  
 
       
         
 
 
        (12) 
(11) and (12) give us the optimal output levels in both cases, such that 
  
  
     (   )
      
 and   
  
         (   )
      
. 
To comply with our earlier assumption, the   firms nevertheless produce a positive output 
     (   )    for all    , i.e.     
   
   
. Then, the equilibrium profits are 
  (  
   )  (       
   (         
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(     (   ))
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 (14) 
Finally, relevance is the difference between these two profits (13) and (14) such that 
 (     )     (  
   )    (  
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(   )(       (   )       )
      
  
and 
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  .  
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Figures 
 
Fig. 1. RD’s rate of appropriation when         or          .  
 
 
Fig. 2. Market clearing in the equilibrium,   ⌈ 
 
      
⌉     
 
      
. 
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Fig. 3. RD’s rate of appropriation as a function of the first period price 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4a and b. The equilibrium values of   , ∑   and    over time when       and       
(4a) or       (4b).  
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